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It has been claimed that kinetic energy is an objective physical 
quantity whilst at the same time maintaining that potential energy is 
not. However, by making use of the method of ‘inference to the best 
explanation’, it may be readily concluded that potential energy is 
indeed an objective physical quantity. This is done for an example 
drawn from the foundations of modern chemistry. In order to do so, 
the criteria of what counts as ‘most probable’ and ‘most reasonable’ 
are defined and then employed for choosing the best explanation. 
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Any physics textbook will apprise its readers that potential energy is the 
energy stored in physical systems and is central to the law of the 
conservation of energy (see e.g. Serway and Jewett 2008, chap. 7-8; 
Halliday et al. 2013, chap. 8; Young and Freedman 2016, chap. 7; Shankar 
2019, chap. 5-6). Physics, engineering and chemistry textbooks are full of 
examples showing the operation of potential energy in all sorts of physical 
situations. Potential energy as a principal feature of physical phenomena 
has been accepted wholeheartedly for more than a century by the vast 
majority of physicists, chemists, and engineers worldwide. 
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It is somewhat surprising then, that the respected American physicist 
Eugene Hecht made the claim in 2016 that potential energy does not 
physically exist. He wrote: 
 
Although PE [potential energy] describes a significant aspect 
of the state of a system and is therefore indispensable 
theoretically, it is no longer required to be a physical actuality 
[…]. (Hecht 2016, 2, italics added) 
 
It seems here that Hecht is declaring potential energy to be “indispensable 
theoretically” so that his conclusion about potential energy not having 
“physical actuality” would not be immediately dismissed as ridiculous by 
most scientists and by many philosophers of science. It was not that Hecht 
was claiming energy per se does not exist as he explicitly maintained the 
“physical actuality” of kinetic energy (i.e. he affirms that kinetic energy 
exists in the physical world). Hecht, in effect, claimed that potential energy 
is only an instrumental hypothesis (albeit an indispensable one), i.e. only a 
theoretical ‘device’ or ‘instrument’, used for tracking changes in physical 
systems and for making predictions. Such theoretical ‘instruments’ are also 
referred to by some philosophers of science as ‘conceptual fictions’ (see 
Stace 1934; Quine 1951; Smart 1968, 152; Giere 1988, 26). 
 
Hecht is pursuing his own realist agenda claiming that kinetic energy exists 
in the physical world and denying this for potential energy. We’ll briefly 
summarise, in the next section, Hecht’s justification for this position and 
why it fails. However, we need to acknowledge upfront that because 
scientific realism conjures up all sorts of issues, problems and images (see 
e.g. Giere 1988, chap. 4-5; Okasha 2002, chap. 4; Psillos 2009; McCain 
2016, 219–223), we cannot do justice to it in the space of this article. 
Instead, we shall take the (minimal) realist ontological perspective of 
energy which holds that energy is a quantity (as it can be given a numerical 
value) having a physical existence and which is an essential attribute of 
physical systems. Such a realist ontology is rejected by instrumentalists 
who view energy as only a theoretical ‘device’ for making predictions and 
a kind of hypothetical ‘ledger’ to describe changes in physical systems. 
The expressions ‘physically objective quantity’ and ‘physical objectivity’ 
will be used as a shorthand for the minimal realist ontology in which 
energy has an essential physical existence (rather than using Hecht’s terms 
‘physical actuality’ and ‘objective reality’). The relevant issues may then 
be discussed without having to venture into the wider morass of 
philosophical realism. 
 
The aim of this article is to present a case for potential energy being a 
physically objective quantity. The rest of the article will proceed as 
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follows. Section 2 discusses the failure of Hecht’s physical argument and 
highlights the philosophical implications to be examined. Section 3 
discusses the importance of potential energy and its explanatory role in 
contemporary physics. Section 4 outlines the method of ‘inference to the 
best explanation’ and presents a concrete example of how to find the best 
explanation. Section 5 applies this method to the case of potential energy. 
Section 6 delivers a verdict on the ontological status of potential energy. 
Section 7 answers the question about potential energy’s theoretical 
indispensability and summarises the article’s conclusions. 
 
 
2. Failure of Hecht’s Physical Argument and its Philosophical 
Implications 
 
Hecht’s physical argument against potential energy is based on his claims 
about what is and what is not directly measurable. He assumed that if a 
quantity could be directly measured then it has physical objectivity (Hecht 
2016, 8). Hecht concluded that potential energy is not a physically 
objective quantity chiefly because he maintained that it cannot be directly 
measured. On the other hand, he claimed that kinetic energy is directly 
measurable and hence is a physically objective quantity. Hecht’s approach 
has some features in common with the view of prominent instrumentalist 
Bas van Fraassen (1980), except for Hecht’s acceptance of the physical 
objectivity of kinetic energy. Nonetheless, Hecht is excessively 
instrumental as his view: 
 
• must accept that the quantitative formalism of potential energy has 
enormous utility, i.e. the widespread usefulness and accuracy of the 
(mathematical) formalism for description and prediction of 
phenomena in physics, engineering and chemistry, but does so 
without explaining why potential energy has this immense utility; and 
• concedes that the potential energy hypothesis cannot be done away 
with (i.e. is “indispensable theoretically”), again without explaining 
why this is so. 
 
In addition to these shortcomings, it has become evident that Hecht’s view 
ultimately ‘derails’ for, most critically, kinetic energy is no more directly 
measurable than is potential energy. The lack of direct measurability of 
kinetic energy may be seen as follows. 
 
In order to ‘measure’ the kinetic energy of an object, a number of steps are 
required and this usually includes the empirical determination of the 
object’s speed. Speed may be determined by performing measurements of 
successive positions of an object over specified time intervals. The object’s 
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speed is then calculated using these values of position and time and this 
result is substituted into an equation for kinetic energy to obtain a 
numerical value (Riggs 2019, 3). Furthermore, it turns out that detailed 
analyses of alternative empirical methods for ‘measuring’ an object’s 
kinetic energy reveal that the operations involve direct measurements only 
of position and/or time (Riggs 2019, 4). In other words, there simply cannot 
be any direct measurement of kinetic energy. Therefore, if Hecht’s 
assumption regarding how to establish physical objectivity is accepted, 
then neither kinetic energy nor potential energy could be accepted as 
objective quantities! Hecht’s argument thereby fails to achieve his goal of 
establishing that potential energy is not physically objective whilst still 
affirming the objectivity of kinetic energy. 
 
There are obviously some pertinent philosophical issues arising in this 
context. Consider the following broad questions: 
 
― What is implied if potential energy does not have physical objectivity? 
and 
― What follows if potential energy is an objective physical quantity? 
 
In particular, what issues immediately stand out from these questions? In 
respect to the first question, if potential energy is not an objective physical 
quantity then we have the seemingly inexplicable situation where, despite 
not having physical objectivity, potential energy nevertheless 
quantitatively describes a significant aspect of the state of any physical 
system, irrespective of the constitution of the system (e.g. being composed 
of ‘dark’ matter) and of any and all extreme conditions in its vicinity. Such 
conditions could include being subject to the pressure in the core of a 
planet, or the temperature inside a star, or the gravitational ‘tidal forces’ 
exerted near a stellar-mass black hole. In respect to the second question, if 
potential energy is an objective physical quantity then it should be possible 
to validly infer its objective status. The method of ‘inference to the best 
explanation’ will be applied below as part of a case which concludes that 
potential energy is a physically objective quantity. This conclusion will 
also resolve the above described seemingly inexplicable situation. 
 
 
3. Potential Energy in Contemporary Physics and its Explanatory 
Significance 
 
There is no general expression for energy, as articulated by the French 
physicist and philosopher of science, Henri Poincaré: 
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[…] In every particular case we clearly see what energy is, 
and we can give it at least a provisory definition: but it is 
impossible to find a general definition of it (Poincaré 1905, 
132). 
 
Our observations of the natural world have led to the stipulation that there 
are only two fundamental types of energy. Needless to say, these are 
kinetic energy (energy of motion) and potential energy (stored energy). We 
typically illustrate these two types of energy with reference to individual 
physical situations. There are, of course, countless numbers of very 
common examples including: falling objects, ferrous metal fragments 
pulled towards magnets, pieces of paper attracted to plastic rubbed on 
wool, etc. Such instances also show the working of the law of energy 
conservation, i.e. energy may be transformed from potential to kinetic (and 
vice versa) thereby conserving total energy. 
 
Potential energy in contemporary physics is understood as an aspect of 
physical systems, as stated in a leading physics textbook: 
 
[…] [i]f the energy change of the system is not in the form of 
kinetic energy […] we call the energy storage mechanism 
[…] potential energy […] [and] find that the potential energy 
of a system can only be associated with specific types of 
forces acting between members of a system. (Serway and 
Jewett 2008, 178) 
 
The quantification of a system’s potential energy is expressed in terms of 
the relative configuration of the parts of the system, e.g. positions of 
particles making up the system. It is also well established that each force 
is mediated by a physical field which ensures causal connection and 
conservation of energy. Consequently, potential energy may be 
characterised as the energy stored in physical fields. An electrically 
charged particle such as an electron, for example, placed inside an external 
electric field will gain kinetic energy and accelerate by drawing on some 
of the potential energy in the electric field enclosing it. 
 
The enormous utility of the potential energy hypothesis allows for both 
qualitative and quantitative descriptions of dynamical phenomena (i.e. of 
the changes that occur in physical systems). In this context, it should be 
pointed out that phenomena explained by the hypothesis of potential 
energy are exceedingly familiar in our homes, workplaces, and in research 
laboratories and industrial facilities. The most commonplace of such 
phenomena include: 
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Ø conversions of practical energy modes as observed every day, e.g. 
electrical to light, chemical to mechanical, solar to heat; and 
Ø the self-restoration of deformed elastic materials with accompanying 
motion, e.g. compressed or extended springs. 
 
In its quantified expressions, the hypothesis of potential energy is a crucial 
part of descriptions of the changes in physical systems in accordance with 
known laws of nature in specific areas of science, e.g. with the laws of 
electromagnetism, nuclear reactions, gravitation, materials science, and 
chemical reactivity. The quantitative expressions of potential energy, not 
surprisingly, are different for each of the fundamental forces of nature. The 
expression for the electrostatic potential energy in a given spatial region, 
for example, depends on the number, polarity, and distribution of electric 
charges in that region. This is totally different from say, the expression for 
the potential energy of an atomic nucleus due to the Strong Nuclear force 
(i.e. the force which holds the nucleus together). The various expressions 
for potential energy reflect the different natures of the fundamental forces. 
 
Subject to the law of energy conservation, quantitative changes in potential 
energy appear as kinetic energy in its various forms, e.g. heat (as increased 
kinetic energy of surrounding particles). Indeed, the (factual) outcomes of 
a staggering number of physics, chemical, and biological experiments and 
also engineering processes (see Jaffe and Taylor 2018, esp. chap. 9) which 
are predicted and explained by the hypothesis of potential energy testifies 
to it being crucial to describing changes in physical systems. Although 
these empirical outcomes highlight the utility of potential energy, 
enquiring into their basis inevitably leads back to the questions of whether 
potential energy is an objective physical quantity and why it is that 
potential energy (in Hecht’s words) “describes a significant aspect of the 
state of a system […]” (Hecht 2016, 2). We shall provide suitable answers 
to these questions. 
 
 
4. Finding the Best Explanation 
 
Arguments for and against the method of ‘inference to the best 
explanation’ are easily found in the philosophical literature (e.g. Harman 
1965; Vogel 1998; Okasha 2002; Lipton 2004; Psillos 2009; Mackonis 
2013; McCain and Poston 2017). It is beyond the scope of this article to 
review these arguments. Instead, we shall accept (as many philosophers 
do) that this method yields explanations which are true (or at least very 
likely to be true), when based on accurate premises and properly conducted 
(see Psillos 2009, chap. 10; Brössel 2013, 53) as the method “exploits the 
truth-conducive virtues of explanation” (Kosso 1992, 98). In order to assist 
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in a determination of the ontological status of potential energy (i.e. to 
conclude that it is a physically objective quantity), we shall perform an 
inference to the best explanation. 
 
The schema for making an inference to the best explanation has the general 
form (McCain 2016, 158): 
 
(1) There is a set F of related facts (e.g. observation statements, 
measurements, etc.) requiring an explanation. 
(2) A particular explanation E accounts for all the facts in F. 
(3) E accounts for F better than any other known explanation. 
 
Yet, the schema (1) – (3) is just the ‘bare bones’ and we need to ‘flesh out’ 
an inference to the best explanation by initially adding the following to this 
schema (cf. Schick and Vaughn 1995, chap. 5): 
 
(4) Any acceptable explanation must not be logically inconsistent. 
(5) Any acceptable explanation must be compatible with relevant, 
established theories or confirmed data (i.e. with background 
knowledge). 
(6) Any acceptable explanation must not postulate entities or activities of 
dubious kinds, e.g. violations of known natural laws, speculative (and 
unverified) physical effects, animated cadavers, magical spells, etc. 
 
A domestic example will serve to demonstrate the operation of the schema 
(1) – (6) and how we ought to decide which explanation counts as best, 
before this schema is applied to the case of potential energy. Suppose that 
I arrive at my (locked) house one night to find that the pieces on my 
chessboard have been orderly rearranged from where they were earlier that 
same day. I observe that no one is in the house, there are no indications of 
forced entry, no items appear to be missing, and nothing seems to have 
been disturbed except for the chess pieces. How then might this orderly 
rearrangement of the chess pieces be explained? I begin my deliberations 
with bringing to mind aspects which are relevant to this situation by: 
 
§ attempting to recall all of my actions before leaving my house this 
morning; 
§ noting that no visitors nor deliveries were expected or scheduled 
today; 
§ noting that house burglaries are quite common in my city; 
§ noting who has a key to my house;  
§ noting that several people have previously told me that the chess 
pieces should be rearranged on aesthetic grounds; and 
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§ discounting any dubious entities and processes which might be 
postulated as causes of the movement of the chess pieces (e.g. psychic 
levitation). 
 
I thereby incorporate conditions (4) – (6) into the process of formulating 
suitable explanations from which the best one may be inferred. 
 
Using both my observations and thoughts on the situation, I am led to the 
formulation of four possible explanations: 
 
a) It was myself who repositioned the chess pieces before leaving the 
house in the morning but, as I had several pressing issues on my mind 
needing immediate attention, I simply forgot that I had moved them 
and have not been able to recall this. 
b) There has been a ground shaking event at my house’s location during 
the day which caused the chess pieces to shift position. 
c) An unknown individual broke into my house in a way yet to be 
discovered, moved the chess pieces on motives unknown and then 
departed without taking anything. 
d) A particular friend who has the only other key, let herself into my 
house, rearranged the chess pieces, removed nothing, and locked the 
house upon leaving. 
 
Since I am not prone to having memory lapses and there are no apparent 
signs of a break-in, or of robbery, nor any obvious indications of a ground 
shaking event, I would tend to accept explanation (d). However, just 
because I have not found any evidence of a break-in, or of ground shaking, 
or of definite forgetfulness does not, by themselves, eliminate 
explanations (a), (b) and (c), i.e. all four explanations still account for the 
movement of the chess pieces and satisfy conditions (4) – (6) above. In the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, the four explanations remain in 
contention and I need something more to decide which of the four 
explanations is the best explanation and why it is best. 
 
Additional factors have to be taken into account to make and justify this 
decision. There is (as a minimum) one relevant factor which applies to each 
of the explanations (a) – (d). First, on the basis of my medical history and 
current medical state, my personal physician assures me that any loss of 
memory of recent experienced events is extremely unlikely. Second, the 
local geology is so stable that a ground shaking event would be highly 
improbable. Third, given what usually occurs in house burglaries in my 
city, it would also be improbable that a stranger should go to the trouble of 
breaking into my house and then take nothing when there are valuable 
items inside. Fourth, knowing the character of my friend with the house 
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key, it is quite likely that she would let herself into my house when I am 
not there so that she can ‘play a joke’ on me. 
 
My analysis of the situation and its additional factors leads me to arrive at 
the following deductions. The possibility of any continuing inability to 
recall recent events on my part may safely be dismissed. A ground shaking 
event strong enough to shift the chess pieces would not leave them as 
found, i.e. all upright and orderly. A burglar would not be bothered to 
orderly shift the chess pieces (or anything else). My friend with the house 
key would move the chess pieces if she was alone in my house. 
 
The criteria for choosing which particular explanation is best out of a 
competing set of explanations has been argued over in the philosophical 
literature (at least) since the publication of Gilbert Harman’s seminal 
papers on the topic (Harman 1965, 1968) and remains the subject of debate 
(cf. Glass 2012, 412; McCain 2016, 159-160). This debate is obfuscated 
by the situation that the meanings of some of the terms used in discussions 
of the criteria vary. Most prominent amongst criteria deemed suitable is 
the criterion of coherence which is considered central to determining the 
best explanation (Kosso 1992, 100). Adolfas Mackonis, for example, 
draws attention to the term ‘coherence’ sometimes being used to mean 
‘consistency with background knowledge’ and on other occasions to mean 
‘plausibility with respect to background knowledge’ (Mackonis 2013, 
980). We shall avoid adding to the confusion over ‘coherence’ by not 
utilising the term at all. How then shall we decide which explanation is 
best? 
 
Although explanations (a), (b) and (c) are not logically excluded, in light 
of the facts, the additional factors and my deductions, I infer that 
explanation (d) is the best explanation. Why? There are two clear reasons 
for reaching this conclusion. Given how the argument developed following 
the schema (1) – (6), these reasons are that explanation (d) is: 
 
v the most probable of the four explanations as it has likely 
circumstances in its favour and the other three explanations do not; 
and 
v the most reasonable of the four explanations as it stands up better to 
rational analysis than the other three explanations do. 
 
These are sufficient for deciding which of the explanations (a) – (d) is best. 
Therefore, the criteria for choosing the best explanation may be limited to 
‘most probable’ and ‘most reasonable’ (as defined). This outcome 
vindicates our use of the same criteria in the case of potential energy and 
we need look no further for suitable criteria. 
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5. Applying ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’ to the Potential 
Energy Case 
 
It was stated in Section 2 that potential energy (and also kinetic energy) 
are not directly measurable. The method of ‘inference to the best 
explanation’ is the appropriate form of inference when dealing with 
quantities that are not directly measured, as pointed out by Adolfas 
Mackonis: 
 
Any argument for the truth or reality of a theoretical term, 
concept, entity or theory in general is an instance of IBE 
[Inference to the Best Explanation]. IBE is a fundamental 
component of theoretical reasoning in general and of 
scientific practice in particular. (Mackonis 2013, 975–976, 
italics in original) 
 
We shall now apply the schema for finding the best explanation to the 
potential energy case. Returning to the schema (1) – (6), suppose 
explanation E has both kinetic energy and potential energy as components. 
Let the set F in condition (1) be the huge number and assortment of both 
commonplace and scientific facts as mentioned in Section 3. Let 
condition (2) hold for E being the potential energy explanation, i.e. all the 
facts comprising this set F are explained by E. On the basis of both 
empirical and theoretical findings made over more than a century, 
conditions (4) – (6) also all hold for E. The question which then emerges 
is whether condition (3) holds. If so, then this might be considered enough 
justification for taking E to be correct. 
 
Just as in the domestic example, we need to stipulate the relevant 
alternatives to E to answer this question. These alternatives may be 
denoted, for current purposes, as explanations which accept kinetic energy 
as a component but not potential energy. Assume that conditions (4) – (6) 
apply to the alternatives to E and that these alternatives can explain (by 
various means not including potential energy) the facts in set F. Given the 
depiction of E and its alternatives, we have a situation paralleling the 
domestic example as, in order to decide whether condition (3) holds, other 
factors are required. Fortunately, a decision regarding condition (3) is 
readily ascertainable by contemplating an example drawn from the 
foundations of modern chemistry. In doing so, we will proceed in a similar 
manner to the domestic example and employ the same criteria of ‘most 
probable’ and ‘most reasonable’ for choosing which explanation is best. 
 
Much of chemistry and biochemistry is based on an understanding of the 
bonds between atoms/molecules, i.e. on chemical bonds and their 
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reactivity (Luo 2007, 1; Kolasinski 2017, 570; Sagan and Mitoraj 2019, 
4616). There can be little doubt that chemical bonds (of some kind) do 
have physical objectivity or else macroscopic matter (including biological 
organisms) would not exist. Moreover, the objectivity of chemical bonds 
is now well established by the empirical data collected from a variety of 
experiments (see Shin et al. 2002; Friedrich 2018; Wilson et al. 2019; Hu 
et al. 2019; Cao et al. 2020), as frankly expressed by Valerio Magnasco: 
“Experimental evidence shows that molecules [...] have a structure made 
of bonds [...]” (Magnasco 2010, xi). 
 
There are three main classifications of chemical bonds: covalent, ionic, and 
metallic. These bonds are constituted, to some extent, by the forces 
between parts of atoms/molecules (i.e. between parts of microscopic 
physical systems). It was already noted in Section 3 that it is generally 
accepted that the potential energy of any physical system is associated with 
specific types of forces between parts of the system. This association of 
potential energy does, of course, apply to the forces acting on 
atoms/molecules (Housecroft and Constable 2006, 113–114) and 
accordingly, applies to chemical bonds. The physical fields which mediate 
each force not only ensure causal connection and conservation of energy 
but also (in chemical reactions) ensure the contiguity of bonding. 
 
How are chemical bonds made? Let’s consider a standard account of their 
formation. The most common bond in molecules is the covalent bond 
where the electrons from individual atoms are shared in a molecule. The 
simplest illustration is the single covalent bond between two hydrogen (H) 
atoms in the hydrogen molecule (H2). When two hydrogen atoms initially 
separated by a large distance (in comparison to their size) approach each 
other, the electrons and protons in each atom have kinetic energy and each 
atom has potential energy. When the atoms become sufficiently close, each 
will contribute an electron which are then shared between the two atoms 
forming a covalent bond (Kolasinski 2017, 570–571). Why should these 
electrons get into a shared arrangement? The answer is straight-forward in 
terms of potential energy and because natural processes always tend (other 
things being equal) towards the lowest available energy state (Zumdahl 
2009, 595). The standard account for the creation of chemical bonds is that 
when the atoms closely approach each other, there is a lowering of the total 
potential energy in the course of forming the molecule (Levine 2009, 457; 
Silberberg 2012, 329). The amount by which the potential energy is 
reduced appears as (i.e. is converted into) heat which disperses into the 
surrounding environment (Zumdahl 2009, 411). In general, the lower 
energy state that arises when atoms bond together creates stability and 
permits the growth of elaborate physical structures to proceed. We shall 
see that examining two factors concerning energy and chemical bonds 
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brings out the issues which are important for making an inference to the 
best explanation in this example. 
 
The first factor is about the decreases in the energy of the bonding atoms. 
These decreases actually happen when chemical bonding occurs, e.g. heat 
is released during the formation of chemical compounds. Such decreases 
are confirmed by measurements of temperature changes in numerous 
chemical reactions of relevant kinds showing, independent of specific 
theoretical models, that decreases in energy do occur when atoms bond. 
The potential energy explanation offers a mechanism which quantitatively 
accounts for the energy released when bonds form as the amount of heat 
measured correlates with the calculated decreases in potential energy (cf. 
Luo 2007; Zumdahl 2009, 361; Silberberg 2012, 345; Gupta 2016, 391-
392). Conversely, reactions in which chemical compounds are dissociated, 
i.e. reactions that break bonds, require precise energy inputs (e.g. by 
applying heat or an electric current) for the reactions to proceed (see Luo 
2007). Note that chemical reactions will not proceed and no structures will 
grow unless energetically possible (Gupta 2016, 387). 
 
These energy correlations tie potential energy to chemical bonding and 
therefore strongly support the potential energy explanation. Alternative 
explanations, i.e. ones without potential energy and for which conditions 
(4) – (6) apply, are not generally supported by these energy considerations 
since they must postulate (rather than calculate) some other means to 
account for the heat released/absorbed in chemical reactions. These 
alternative explanations lack the very specific correlations between the 
heat released/absorbed and the quantitative changes that are calculable 
from the formalism of potential energy. This indicates a higher probability 
for the potential energy explanation than for its alternatives, i.e. the 
potential energy explanation is the most probable explanation for the 
formation of chemical bonds. 
 
The second factor concerns potential energy and bond characteristics. 
Chemical bonds have characteristics such as bond length, bond angle and 
bond strength, which are quantifiable. Bond length in the hydrogen 
molecule, for example, is the distance between the nuclei of the two H 
atoms when the energy of the molecule as a whole is a minimum (Zumdahl 
2009, 595). The bond angle is the angle formed by the bonds in a molecule 
consisting of three or more atoms (Housecroft and Constable 2006, 200). 
Bond strength is defined in terms of the energy needed to break a particular 
bond (Silberberg 2012, 339). Potential energy is intimately linked to the 
characteristics of chemical bonds. Consider the changes in the energy of a 
molecule which occur when its structure is altered, e.g. when there are 
changes in bond length. Such changes are quantified by chemists using an 
Inference to the Best Explanation 
 111 
extremely powerful analytical tool called the ‘potential energy surface’ 
(PES) which gives a molecule’s energy as a function of the positions of its 
atoms (Gupta 2016, 216). The PES allows molecular shapes (e.g. bond 
lengths and angles) and reaction rates to be determined, as succinctly stated 
by chemist V. P. Gupta: 
 
During a reaction process, the molecules undergo structural 
changes that change their energies. The way the energy of a 
molecule changes with small changes in its structure is 
specified by its potential energy surface. (Gupta 2016, 390) 
 
The PES displays potential energy linkages to chemical bonds in the 
context of their characteristics and demonstrates that potential energy is 
integral to molecular structure and the conduct of chemical reactions 
(Wales 2003, 1; Gupta 2016, 218). 
 
These potential energy linkages are vital to the consistency of accounts of 
the stability of chemical compounds, their reactivity, and their resulting 
structures in conjunction with the forces acting within and between 
atoms/molecules. This is not just a matter of its utility for the following 
reason. The extent to which the potential energy linkages are essential to 
the characteristics of (empirically verified) chemical bonds and the 
chemical structures which arise from them is such that chemical reactions 
and structure building does not make sense without the potential energy 
linkages. Accordingly, the potential energy explanation stands up to 
rational analysis in a way that its alternatives do not. Therefore, the 
potential energy explanation is also the most reasonable explanation for 
the formation of chemical bonds. 
 
Since the potential energy explanation not only accounts for the relevant 
facts about chemical bonds but is more probable and more reasonable than 
its alternatives, the set criteria are met for choosing the best explanation. 
Therefore, the potential energy explanation is the best explanation for the 
formation of chemical bonds. 
 
 
6. The Ontological Status of Potential Energy 
 
Does potential energy have the ontological status of being a physically 
objective quantity? Since it has been shown that the potential energy 
explanation is both the most probable and the most reasonable explanation 
for the formation of chemical bonds and that the criteria of ‘most probable’ 
and ‘most reasonable’ are sufficient for making an inference to the best 
explanation, it has also been inferred that the potential energy explanation 
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is the best explanation for the formation of chemical bonds and, by 
extension, the chemical structures which subsequently stem from them. 
 
Is this enough to justify concluding that potential energy is an objective 
physical quantity? Those who think that best explanations are true would 
answer affirmatively. Although the best explanation argument presented 
here does offer very compelling grounds for accepting the physical 
objectivity conclusion, it remains contestable for even best explanations 
cannot guarantee the truth of a conclusion. Therefore, we are arguably still 
a step removed from conferring physical objectivity on potential energy. 
What is needed to bridge the gap in this case is one or more instances where 
the denial of potential energy’s physical objectivity would have outcomes 
contrary to established results. Instances of this kind would allow the 
argument to advance past the terminal point achieved by ‘inference to the 
best explanation’.  
 
There is at least one such instance relevant to chemical bonds. If potential 
energy were not an objective physical quantity, then what would follow in 
light of the energy linkages outlined in the previous section? Let’s consider 
this issue. We have seen that potential energy is intimately linked to 
chemical bonds in a manner that goes beyond the utility of the potential 
energy formalism. It was especially emphasised that the potential energy 
linkages are so essential to chemical bonds that the characteristics and 
structure of bonds would not make sense without these linkages. Yet, if 
potential energy was not an objective physical quantity then the potential 
energy linkages could not be physically objective either. In the absence of 
these linkages, there would be an absurd situation where molecules would 
not have the physical conditions needed for their existence. Consequently, 
it would follow from potential energy not being physically objective that 
chemical bonds would also not have an objective physical existence, 
contrary to the experimental evidence. We conclude then, that this finding 
in conjunction with the potential energy explanation being the best 
explanation, does indeed warrant the status of physical objectivity for 




7. Final Remarks 
 
The conclusion reached with the aid of the method of ‘inference to the best 
explanation’ is that potential energy is a physically objective quantity and 
not just a theoretical ‘instrument’. Acceptance of potential energy as 
physically objective provides an explanation which extends further than 
mere theoretical utility can. This conclusion also provides an answer to the 
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question of why potential energy “describes a significant aspect of the state 
of a system”. It is precisely because potential energy is an objective 
physical quantity which is essential to the workings of any physical system 
that the potential energy formalism provides precise descriptions of aspects 
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